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A B S T R A C T
Coopetition is prevalent in today's dynamic business environment and has attracted research interests. Using
coopetitive-based view, this study examines the antecedents and drivers of infrastructure sharing (IS) among
local and multinational mobile network operators (MNOs) in Africa. Based on 21 interviews with different
stakeholders in seven sub-Sahara African (SSA) countries, we develop an integrative framework of industry/
market, technological, and institutional factors that affect IS between MNOs. We find evidence of institutional
factors shaping the impact of the industry structure and technological factors on firms’ propensity to engage in
coopetitive strategies. There is evidence that in contexts with low-level IS, inadequate regulatory interventions
mean that the existing market conditions are reproduced, leading to further competitive behaviours from MNOs.
For high- level IS, MNOs tend to engage in further coopetitive strategies through strategic learning and cooperate
to resolve technological incompatibilities and engage in standards settings. We extend the existing scholarly
works on coopetition and IS literature by providing an in-depth understanding of the obstacles faced by MNOs in
adopting IS. The study further highlights that IS requires a shift from the competitive-based logic to a dynamic,
coopetitive one, which is nonetheless challenging to achieve with limited institutional capacity and support.
1. Introduction
A prevalent characteristic of today's dynamic global business en-
vironment is the coopetition among firms, which refers to the si-
multaneous cooperation and competition between rival firms in certain
domains (Amankwah-Amoah, 2020; Bengston & Raza-Ullah, 2016;
Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1995; Luo, 2007). Specifically, around half
of inter-firm relationships are between competing firms (Dagnino &
Padulo, 2007; Rai, 2013). Coopetition involves competing firms com-
mitting to common goals and sharing complementary resources to
create value, while also competing for value appropriation and through
independent actions in various domains to improve performance
(Bouncken et al., 2020; Estrada et al., 2016; Luo, 2007). In coopetitive
relationships, competing firms work together to collectively enhance
their efficiency, access and create new knowledge, access new markets,
and increase market power (Ritala, 2012).
As an emerging research field, several articles on coopetition have
been published over the past two decades, marking a considerable ad-
vancement in the body of knowledge on this topic (Lascaux, 2020). This
research stream suggests that the disposition to engage in coopetition
varies across firms, industries, and contexts (Czakon et al., 2020). Re-
cent reviews further highlight the focus on manufacturing firms of most
coopetition studies in the context of research and development (R&D)
collaboration and the limited attention paid to coopetition among ser-
vice firms (Dorn et al., 2016). Moreover, the existing coopetition stu-
dies neglect the role of external institutions and government policies for
coopetition (Dorn et al., 2016). The insufficient research on external
institutions’ role in rivals’ coopetitive dynamics represents a severe
shortcoming in understanding the nature of coopetition (Dorn et al.,
2016; Lascaux, 2020). This is particularly the case for industries with
substantial regulatory involvement, such as the telecommunications
industry. Therefore, scholars have emphasised the necessity for further
research on the drivers, barriers, and outcomes of coopetition to de-
termine the nature and characteristics of the coopetitive processes and
improve our overall understanding of coopetition (Gnyawali et al.,
2016; Lascaux, 2020).
An important question in the related literature is whether coopeti-
tion can be induced or mandated in a competitive market by regulatory
bodies (Bengston & Raza-Ullah, 2016; Czernek & Czakon, 2016;
Dorn et al., 2016; Givoni & Banister, 2006; Kylanen & Rusko, 2011).
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Mariani (2007) notes that cooperation mandated by regulators could
result in shifting managers’ mental models and cognitive maps from
competitive to coopetitive ones. Mariani (2007) further conjectures that
this shifting of mental logic could hold in highly regulated industries
and calls for more studies to understand induced coopetition under
different settings. In this study, we first adopt a coopetitive-based view
(Amankwah-Amoah, 2020) for examining the antecedents and drivers of
infrastructure sharing (IS) among local and multinational mobile network
operators (MNOs) in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Secondly, the study ex-
plores the roles of institutions in the coopetition dynamics among MNOs. In
sum, our overarching research question therefore is: what are the drivers
and barriers to IS among the MNOs in SSA?
The choice of the telecommunications industry in SSA as a research
setting is apposite. Accordingly, coopetition among firms in the tele-
communications industry is increasing due to the changing nature of
technologies and products, as well as the potential to access and share
partners’ resources (Sanou et al., 2016). However, we know little about
the nature of coopetitive networks and their performance consequences
for firms (Sanou et al., 2016). The importance of understanding coo-
petition among MNOs in Africa is relevant, given the critical and en-
abling role of mobile telecommunications in helping people across the
continent participate in various socio-economic activities such as agri-
culture, business development, civic engagement, democracy, educa-
tion, financial inclusion, and job searches (Amankwah-Amoah, 2019;
Asongu & Le Roux, 2017; You et al., 2019). Access to mobile tele-
communications is also considered vital for the transformation and
development of developing countries (Amankwah-Amoah, 2015, 2016;
You et al., 2020).
To address the above research gaps, we conducted a multiple qua-
litative case study for seven SSA countries. Based on 21 interviews with
different stakeholder groups, we developed an integrative framework of
the industry/market, technological, and institutional factors that affect
the IS between MNOs across the telecommunications industry in SSA.
Our study thus contributes to the coopetition and IS literature by pro-
viding an in-depth understanding of the obstacles faced by MNOs in
adopting IS in Africa. The study further highlights that IS requires a
shift from the competitive-based logic to a dynamic, coopetitive one,
which is nonetheless challenging to achieve with limited institutional
capacity and support. Finally, the findings highlight pertinent policy
issues and other stakeholder considerations with regards to IS.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section re-
views the coopetition literature, with a focus on the motives, drivers,
and antecedents of IS in the telecommunications industry. This is fol-
lowed by an overview of IS between the MNOs in Africa. The metho-
dology employed in the study is then discussed and followed by a
presentation of the findings. Finally, we discuss the findings and present
the implications for research, practice, and policymakers.
2. Coopetition and infrastructure sharing
As a concept, coopetition refers to a collaborative arrangement
between two or more competing firms to create value based on com-
plementary or pooled resources (Bouncken et al., 2020). It involves
simultaneous cooperation in functional areas but also rivalry between
firms (Amankwah-Amoah, 2020; Lascaux, 2020; Sanou et al., 2016). A
number of theoretical underpinnings, such as the resource-based view,
game theory, and network theory, have been applied to explicate the
nature of coopetition and the situations whereby firms might be moti-
vated to collaborate with competitors (Ritala, 2012; Sanou et al., 2016).
Accordingly, firms might be motivated to collaborate to increase the
size of their existing markets or to access new ones (Ritala, 2012).
Under coopetition, firms expect to improve their performance or
value creation in terms of new product development, technologies, or
services compared to competition and without the relational rents
(Dyer et al., 2018). The network theory further highlights that inter-
firm relationships can shape firms’ performances and behaviours
(Sanou et al., 2016). The coopetition-based view also suggests that
firms can simultaneously put their capabilities and resources together
in some areas, such as R&D for the design, development, and creation of
products, while intensively competing against each other in other
functional areas, such as promotion (Amankwah-Amoah, 2020).
Therefore, firms may find it beneficial to collaborate with their arch-
rivals even amid intense competition between them (Bouncken et al.,
2020; Lascaux, 2020). Some typical coopetition examples are Ford's
collaboration with General Motors, its arch-rival, in developing high-
efficiency gearboxes and GM's decision to work with Toyota in de-
signing and developing fuel-cell technology (Amankwah-
Amoah, 2020).
Recent contributions to this research stream suggest that firms show
differences in their capabilities and abilities to create new products,
pursue novelty, expand product range, or defend market share, but
their collective collaboration processes enable them to achieve all these
(Bouncken et al., 2020). Moreover, the rising costs of R&D activities and
the declining product-life cycles have facilitated competing firms
pulling resources together to reduce burdens and risks (Gnyawali &
Park, 2009). As such, coopetition provides firms with access to partners’
resources and constrains behaviours (Sanou et al., 2016). Further, it
serves the best strategy for firms to meet the increasingly sophisticated
consumer demands, as well as the fast changing societal and market
needs (Amankwah-Amoah, 2020). Specifically, firms in coopetition
share complementary resources, as well as the risks and costs associated
with developing new products or process solutions to meet changing
market needs (Luo, 2007). Finally, coopetition enhances firms’ bar-
gaining power and ability to influence and shape the regional and na-
tional policies (Amankwah-Amoah, 2020).
Extant studies also discuss the nature of inputs and outputs in inter-
firm relationships (Bouncken et al., 2020) and demonstrate that firms
may experience imbalances regarding the quality and quantity of in-
puts, as well as value capture, due to the differences in their cap-
abilities, abilities, and motivation (Das & Rahman, 2010; Fonti et al.,
2017). This may introduce tension between partners and serve as both a
driver and barrier to value creation in a partnership. Although coope-
tition tension may accentuate firms’ use of partners’ strengths to search
for new solutions, there could be risks associated with opportunism and
protection in both value creation and capture (Gnyawali & Charleton,
2018). Moreover, firms in coopetitive relationships may behave op-
portunistically by reducing their value creation inputs or maximising
their value capture, leading to the partnership ultimately failing
(Fredrich et al., 2019). In some cases, coopetition partners may con-
tribute equally to value creation, but value capture may be different
because of the different motivations and difference in capabilities and
proficiencies between firms (Clauss & Bouncken, 2019; Hoffmann et al.,
2018).
Coopetitive relationships can thus have positive, neutral, or even
negative impacts on both participating firms and the industry (Ritala,
2012). The outcome depends on participating firms’ capabilities and the
external environment (Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). For
example, MNOs argue that it does not make business sense for one MNO
to build networks and then share them with rivals, as this poses a large
financial burden (Cohen & Southwood, 2008; van de
Groenendaal, 2018). Further, the mandatory implementation of IS in
Zimbabwe has led to some resistance, particularly by the incumbent
(i.e. Econet), which had made a larger investment in deploying infra-
structure relative to its rivals over the years (Ndlovu, 2018;
Nhundu, 2015). Additionally, from a regulatory perspective, IS can
have an adverse effect on competition and innovation in the industry.
For example, for a multi-party alliance to work, all the parties involved
must be willing to commit and pool their resources together
(Fonti et al., 2017). Similarly, an IS alliance requires fair and equal
investment from all participating MNOs but may be difficult to achieve
due to varying abilities, capabilities and motivation (Das &
Rahman, 2010; Fonti et al., 2017). Consequently, disputes and tensions
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may arise among MNOs and if not properly managed by the regulators,
this could dissipate to adverse outcomes such as free-riding (Fonti et al.,
2017). If this situation lingers, coopetition between MNOs may not
emerge, creating an unhealthy environment for competition and in-
novation to flourish, and ultimately restrict future IS. In sum, firms’
disposition to engage in coopetition and their perceptions of its benefits
will be determined by both the external environment in which they
operate and their own characteristics.
The coopetition literature has identified several external and in-
ternal determinants of either cooperation or competition (Bengston &
Raza-Ullah, 2016; Dorn et al., 2016). They include institutional factors,
industry and market characteristics, relational characteristics, and firm-
and individual-level factors. External institutions play an important role
in influencing firms’ coopetitive behaviours (Dorn et al., 2016). Speci-
fically, government regulations are ‘powerful’ enablers in influencing a
firm's behaviour in the environmental context (Angeles, 2013). How-
ever, regulatory interventions can either correct market failures or
worsen the situation by creating new ones. Therefore, the institutional
environment plays an important role in inducing or prohibiting coo-
petition. For example, anti-trust laws can formally prohibit competitors
from cooperation (Burgers et al., 1998), while regulatory bodies can
provide incentives or even force companies to cooperate
(Mariani, 2007). Industry and market characteristics can also push or
pull firms away from cooperation. Coopetition is thus likely to arise in
highly concentrated and regulated industries (Dowling et al., 1996).
However, highly uncertain and instable industries can also be con-
ducive to coopetition (Dagnino & Padula, 2007). Further, industries
characterised by short product life cycles and high R&D expenses can
force firms to collaborate (Dorn et al., 2016).
Researchers have also investigated the relational properties of firms
that induce coopetitive behaviours (Barretta, 2008). For example, re-
source complementarity and access to distinctive resources motivate
firms to enter coopetitive relationships (Gnyawali & Park, 2011;
Luo, 2007), as can technological asymmetry and goal congruity (Luo
et al., 2008). Finally, mutual trust between participating firms is vital to
overcome fears of opportunistic behaviours (Ngowi & Pienaar, 2005).
Firm-specific endowments, strategy, and dominant logic also play im-
portant roles in determining their propensities to engage in coopetition
(Gnyawali & Park, 2009). Previous experience of coopetitive relation-
ships increase firm's openness to collaboration based on learning from
prior experiences and routine development. Generally, some firms are
more coopetition oriented than others, which refers to firms’ beha-
vioural disposition to engage in coopetition (Bouncken &
Fredrich, 2012). We next focus on coopetition in the context of infra-
structure sharing among the MNOs in Africa.
3. Background: infrastructure sharing in Africa
In the telecommunications sector, IS refers to the practice of two or
more MNOs sharing telecommunications network for transmitting ser-
vices to end-users (Garcia & Kelly, 2016). The coopetition-based view in
the context of IS between MNOs involves the joint deployment of new
networks, while competing MNOs share existing networks and/or co-
invest in the deployment of new ones. For example, sharing the costs of
civil work for ducting, which accounts for over 80% of the costs of
deploying optical fibre infrastructure, could result in a substantial
amount of cost savings for MNOs (Deloitte, 2015). This approach has
the potential of increasing the pace of network coverage and lowering
the entry barrier into the industry (Kaziboni & Robb, 2015). For in-
stance, in Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe, regulators require new
entrants to share the existing infrastructure with existing MNOs to
avoid the duplication of networks and lower the entry barrier
(Balancing Act, 2015; TeleGeography, 2018).
Another supporting argument is that coopetition reduces the cost of
network deployment and coverage expansion. The sharing of infra-
structure further helps lower the costs burden and its shift to end-users,
especially the cost of mobile data for Internet access (CRASA &
ITU, 2016; Nelwamondo, 2013). Besides affordability, end-users could
also access a variety of innovative services and benefit from wider
network reach as the collaboration on network coverage shifts the
competition among rivals to service quality provision (IFC, 2019;
ITU News Magazine, 2017). Sharing network infrastructure also re-
duces the negative environmental impact of mobile towers and, hence,
lowers the overall environmental footprint of individual MNOs
(ITU News Magazine, 2017).
Depending on the regulatory environment in a country, the two
generic forms of IS include passive IS (PIS) and active IS (AIS)
(Antonopoulos et al., 2015; ITU News Magazine, 2017). While PIS in-
volves the sharing of ‘non-electronic’ infrastructure, AIS involves
sharing ‘active electronic’ equipment or core networks (ITU News
Magazine, 2017). Examples of PIS are the colocation of sites, towers,
buildings, power supply, battery backup, and security (CRASA &
ITU, 2016). AIS includes sharing the various aspects of core networks
such as frequency spectrum, antennas, fibre optics, backhaul equip-
ment, and national roaming (Kaziboni & Robb, 2015). Since AIS in-
volves sharing core networks, it is generally more complex to imple-
ment it relative to PIS (Kaziboni & Robb, 2015). Furthermore, since
core networks may include proprietary technology, the adoption of AIS
among MNOs tends to be limited due to the fear of losing the compe-
titive edge to rivals.
As previously mentioned, in Africa, mobile telecommunication
services play an important role in helping people participate in various
socio-economic activities such as agriculture, business development,
civic engagement, democracy, education, financial inclusion, and job
searches (Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2018; Asongu & Le Roux, 2017;
You et al., 2019). Access to mobile telecommunication services is
therefore vital for the transformation and development of African
countries (Amankwah-Amoah, 2015, 2016; Makhaya & Roberts, 2003;
Overa, 2006). Overall, it was found that development of tele-
communication infrastructure have a strong impact on economic
growth (Batuo, 2015; Donou-Adonsou et al., 2016).
Although the African mobile telecommunications market has wit-
nessed significant growth following the liberalisation of the sector at
the turn of the millennium, this continent is still the least connected
worldwide (A4AI, 2016; Bell, 2017). African countries have an Internet
penetration rate of only 25%, compared to 60% in the Middle East, 88%
in North America, 84% in Western Europe, and the world average of
54% (Adeniran, 2019). Furthermore, while countries in Europe and
North America are increasingly adopting 4G technology and, more re-
cently, 5G, many parts of Africa are still relying on 2G and 3G networks,
which have lower quality of service (QoS) and network coverage levels
(A4AI, 2016; Bell, 2017; Mole & Amadi-Echendu, 2018).
Accordingly, the limited telecommunications infrastructure is a
main reason for the low Internet penetration rate in Africa
(Mansell, 1990; Justman & Teubal, 1995), compounded by the legacy
problem of limited fixed and supporting infrastructure, such as grid
electricity and roads (ITU, 2016; Mtega & Malekani, 2009). Therefore,
the costs burden of deploying mobile networks is significantly higher in
Africa than in other parts of the world. This has led MNOs to focus on
deploying networks in profitable areas leading to a disparity in network
coverage between rural and urban consumers. IS between MNOs is
therefore considered a potential solution for deploying mobile networks
and services across the continent, especially to economically unviable
communities (e.g. Antonopoulos et al., 2015; Garcia & Kelly, 2016).
Using the coopetition-based view, we thus explore the IS antecedents
and drivers among local and MNOs in SSA.
4. Methodology
4.1. Sampling and case selection
Given the paucity of empirical research and lack of public data on
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coopetition among MNOs in SSA, we adopted an exploratory research
approach (Eisenhardt, 1989), which enables us to provide theoretical
insights on coopetition in the context of IS between MNOs. Accordingly,
qualitative case studies are particularly suitable in addressing why and
how research questions, as is the case of this study (Yin, 2014). As we
are exploring the antecedents and drivers of IS among MNOs in SSA, the
qualitative case study approach allows a more in-depth contextual
understanding of these antecedents and drivers within and across cases
(Elsahn et al., 2020). We consider the telecommunications industry of a
country as a case study and unit of analysis (Yin, 2014). We also
complemented the empirical data with data from multiple secondary
sources to identify specific cases and triangulate evidence as to mitigate
the bias inherent to using a single data source (Eisenhardt &
Graebner, 2007). For example, online articles from Alliance for Af-
fordable Internet (A4AI), Balancing Act, IT News Africa, ITWeb Africa,
TeleGeography and TowerXchange were useful for tracking the state of
IS activities across Africa, getting updated information and data on IS
transactions, and identifying interviewees. Further, social media and
webpages of telecom regulators and the International Tele-
communication Union provided information on relevant regulatory
frameworks, archival data on IS, mandated and non-mandated coun-
tries as well as the identification of those responsible for IS regulation,
some of whom were contacted for interviews.
We adopted purposeful sampling in choosing the case studies
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2014). This approach is suitable given the lack
of empirical studies on IS between MNOs in SSA. To make the phe-
nomena of interest observable (Palinkas et al., 2015; Patton, 2002;
Suri, 2011), we focused on the SSA countries where any type of IS
activities have occurred. Before the empirical data collection, we first
explored industry reports, regulatory websites, corporate websites,
specialist magazines, and newspapers to create a list of IS agreements in
the telecommunications industry in Africa. We identified the major IS
deals in 15 African countries between 2010–2019 in Table 1. To reduce
the sample to a manageable level and effectively draw meaningful
comparisons across cases, we subsequently decided to focus on seven
out of the 15 SSA countries (Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, South
Africa, Uganda, and Tanzania) as our empirical setting. Another cri-
terion for selecting our sample was to include cases where IS is formally
mandated or non-mandated but informally practiced by MNOs. Fol-
lowing these criteria, we contacted MNOs and regulators to request
their participation in our study.
4.2. Data collection
The empirical data were collected through semi-structured inter-
views. In total, we conducted 21 interviews with different stakeholders,
such as MNOs managers, regulators, and the civil society, across the
selected seven SSA countries. These stakeholders were identified based
on existing research, reports from the ITU and TowerXchange, as well
as the websites of regulators, towercos, MNOs, and online news articles.
Interviewees were contacted via blogs, emails, LinkedIn, and twitter.
Other participants were further contacted using snowballing based on
the recommendations of interviewees and contacts at various con-
ferences. Interviews were conducted from November 2018 to August
2019, each interview lasting between 40 and 60 minutes. The interview
questions focused on the drivers and obstacles of IS, role of institutions
in IS, and how firms could mitigate existing obstacles.
The respondents included four regulators from Cameroon, Egypt,
Nigeria, and Rwanda; three multinational MNOs public policy directors
with a footprint across 20 African countries; three academics and ICT
researchers with consultancy experience and research interests in di-
gital inclusion in Africa and other emerging economies; three civil so-
ciety and international lenders that promote mobile coverage in dis-
advantaged locations in Africa; and eight access specialists and
universal access and service (UAS) consultants that have executed UAS
projects across 20 African countries. It is important to note that the four
regulatory respondents are somewhat inconsistent with our sample
cases of seven countries. The reason for this is due to the refusal of some
of the regulators to respond to our interview request. For example,
despite several email requests and the lead author engaging with key
regulatory figures across Africa at the Commonwealth
Telecommunications Organisation workshop in London and the first
and second International Telecommunications Society African Regional
Conferences in Accra and Lusaka respectively, many regulators still did
not respond to our interview request.
That said, all interviewees had experience and played key roles in
shaping the telecommunications industry in Africa and other emerging
economies. These respondents were thus knowledgeable enough to
provide quality and accurate information on the sampled cases.
Secondary sources, such as journal articles, the websites of towercos,
MNOs, regulators, and online news articles, were further utilised to
triangulate the primary data from the interviews (Eisenhardt, 1989).
The authors’ interactions with a wider group of stakeholders at the
Commonwealth Telecommunications Organisation in London, virtual
conversation with members of the Internet Society, and participation to
conference presentations and data collection in Ghana, Nigeria,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe, yielded complementary data for the triangu-
lation (Pandit et al., 2018). This triangulation allowed for a more re-
fined perspective and was necessary to help mitigate single source or
single respondent bias.
4.3. Data analysis
We adopted an iterative approach by moving back and forth be-
tween the theory and data to code the 21 interviews using open codes
(Gioia et al., 2013; Hahn, 2008; Miles et al., 2014). We began the open
coding after the second reading of the interview transcripts as to allow
the authors not involved in the data collection to familiarise themselves
with the data (Ryan & Bernard, 2003). Therefore, open coding allowed
the authors to participate in making sense of the data actively and in-
dependently and collectively comparing, adding, deleting, and
amending the codes (Saldana, 2016). Descriptive codes were first de-
veloped, which reflected the interviewees' language (Gioia et al., 2013).
Subsequently, we iterated between the coopetition literature on the
antecedents and drivers of coopetition (Dorn et al., 2016) and our data
to group similar codes into second-order themes. Finally, the second-
order themes were grouped into aggregate themes. The data structure is
presented in Figure 1. In line with our research question, Figure 1 di-
vides the data into two dimensions – the barrier dimension, high-
lighting IS challenges, and the mitigation dimension, with suggestions
on how to improve institutional capacity/incentives and promote co-
opetition for IS. Figure 1 was instrumental in helping the authors
monitor and achieve theoretical saturation (Eisenhardt, 1989).
5. Findings
Consistent with the literature review and secondary data evidence
on IS in SSA, we found that IS remains a relatively limited practice
among the MNOs in SSA, despite the strong policy support.
Furthermore, we observed significant differences in the IS level and
intensity across the countries in our sample. Through in-depth within
and cross-case study analyses, we identified several factors that affect
MNOs’ coopetitive orientation, that is, the extent to which MNOs are
behaviourally disposed towards coopetition (Bouncken &
Fredrich, 2016), and their disposition to engage in IS. These factors are
related to industry/market characteristics and technological and in-
stitutional forces, which together affect MNOs competitive strategies,
practices and their inclination to engage in IS.
Our findings are presented in Fig. 2. Specifically, the institutional
environment shapes the impact of industry/market characteristics and
of technological factors on MNOs’ coopetitive orientation. The out-
come, that is, the level and intensity of IS in a certain sector, recursively
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impacts the market characteristics and technological factors. Contexts
with low IS levels and without efficient regulatory interventions have
led to the reproduction of the market conditions that initially inhibited
IS. Conversely, contexts with high IS levels have led to a change in
market conditions, teaching MNOs how to coopete and further increase
their IS levels. In the following, we outline our findings based on the
dimensions in our theoretical model and their underlying relationships.
5.1. Industry and market characteristics
Our findings indicate that the industry and market characteristics
play important roles in determining MNOs’ disposition to coopete
through IS. Depending on market size and demand level, competition
dynamics, and the level of maturity in the industry in a specific country,
MNOs have different perceptions of IS and its benefits. While the in-
terviewees broadly agreed that IS could result in pooling of resources
and a reduction in the overall costs of network deployment and main-
tenance, particularly through the co-location of servers and sharing
towers and generator sets, there was a lack of consensus on whether IS
would translate into coverage improvement in disadvantaged areas.
Interviewees 7 and 12 asserted, respectively:
I actually don't think infrastructure sharing has a big part to play
here because of the way in which rural villages work.
Network and infrastructure sharing can stop the ridiculous dupli-
cation of infrastructure – but it just can't change the fundamental
economics because if you halve the costs, you halve the revenues,
and it is still the same equation.
The interviewees argued that, while sharing, in general, could lower
costs so that it becomes economically feasible to provide services, it
does not change prevailing circumstances such as a sparse population
density, low ICT usage, and low-income levels in disadvantaged areas.
Hence, there may not be enough customers to compete for or their
ability to afford telecommunication services might be restricted by their
disposable incomes. Further, sharing might not necessarily work in
disadvantaged areas because whoever is first to deploy a technology to
a given village, for example, gets most customers. In this case, MNOs
Table 1
Examples of major infrastructure sharing deals across Africa during 2010–2019.
Sources: Compiled by the authors from various online sources, such as MyBroadband, TechCentral, The EastAfrican, and TowerXchange.
Date Deal Value Outcome Country
2019 SBA Communications acquired 900 towers from Atlas Towers SA via JV USD 140 M Deal completed South Africa
American Tower acquired 5,510 towers from Eaton Towers via outright
acquisition
USD 1.85 B Deal announced, yet to be
completed
Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya; Niger,
Uganda
2018 American Tower acquired 723 towers from Telkom Kenya via SLB Undisclosed Deal announced, yet to be
completed
Kenya
2016 American Tower acquired 300 towers from Eaton Towers Undisclosed Deal announced, yet to be
completed
South Africa
Helios Towers acquired 967 towers from Airtel via SLB USD 165 M Deal completed DRC
IHS Africa acquired 160 towers from Hotspot Undisclosed Deal announced, yet to be
completed
Nigeria
American Tower acquired 1,350 towers from Airtel via SLB USD 179 M Deal announced, yet to be
completed
Tanzania
Helios Towers acquired 185 towers from Zantel via SLB USD 6.7 M Deal partly completed Tanzania
IHS Africa acquired 1,211 towers from Helios Towers Undisclosed Deal completed Nigeria
2015 IHS Africa acquired 555 towers from Etisalat Nigeria (now 9Mobile) via SLB Undisclosed Deal completed Nigeria
Eaton Towers acquired 2,000 towers from Mobinil via SLB USD 131.15 M Deal subsequently cancelled Egypt
2014 IHS Africa acquired 1,269 towers from MTN via SLB Undisclosed Deal completed Rwanda
IHS Africa acquired 550 towers from MTN via SLB USD 48 M Deal completed Rwanda
Helios Towers acquired 394 towers from Airtel via SLB Undisclosed Deal completed Congo B.
IHS Africa acquired 2,136 towers from Etisalat Nigeria via SLB USD 485 M Deal completed Nigeria
IHS Africa acquired 9,151 towers from MTN via JV of 51:49 in favour of
MTN
USD 882 M Deal completed Nigeria
Eaton Towers acquired 2,500 towers from Airtel via SLB Undisclosed Deal partly completed Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Niger,
Uganda
American Tower acquired 4,717 towers form Airtel via SLB USD 1.06 B Deal completed Nigeria
IHS Africa acquired 1,113 towers from Airtel via SLB USD 181 M Deal completed Rwanda, Zambia
IHS Africa acquired 949 towers from Airtel via SLB USD 150 M Deal completed
2013 IHS Africa acquired 2,000 towers from Orange Undisclosed Deal completed Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Zambia
Eaton Towers acquired 1,000 towers from Telkom Kenya Undisclosed Deal subsequently cancelled Kenya
Helios Towers acquired 1,149 towers from Vodacom via SLB USD 75 M Deal completed Tanzania
2012 Eaton Towers acquired 300 towers from Orange via SLB Undisclosed Deal completed Uganda
Eaton Towers acquired 400 towers from Warid via SLB Undisclosed Deal completed Uganda
IHS Africa acquired 820 towers from MTN via SLB USD 143 M Deal completed Cameroon
IHS Africa acquired 931 towers from MTN via SLB USD 141 M Deal completed Cote d'Ivoire
2011 American Tower acquired 1,000 towers from MTN via JV of 51:49 in favour
of American Tower
USD 89 M Deal completed Uganda
2010 Helios Towers acquired 750 towers from Tigo via JV of 60:40 in favour of
Helios Towers
USD 54 M Deal completed Ghana
Helios Towers acquired 400 towers from Multilinks Undisclosed Deal completed Nigeria
IHS Africa acquired 800 towers from Visafone via SLB USD 67 M Deal completed Nigeria
Eaton Towers acquired 750 towers from Vodafone Undisclosed Deal completed Ghana
SWAP acquired 407 towers from Starcomms via SLB USD 81 M Deal completed Nigeria
American Tower acquired 1,400 towers from Cell C via SLB USD 200 M Deal completed South Africa
American Tower acquired 1,876 towers from MTN via JV of 51:49 in favour
of American Tower
USD 21.85 M Deal completed Ghana
Helios Towers acquired 729 towers from Tigo via JV of 60:40 in favour of
Helios
USD 45 M Deal completed DRC
Helios Towers acquired 1,020 towers from Tigo via JV of 60:40 in favour of
Helios
USD 80 M Deal completed Tanzania
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might not be interested in such a location even if there is an opportunity
to share infrastructure.
Furthermore, while the interviewees agreed that more costs-savings
can accrue to MNOs from sharing infrastructure with their rivals, opi-
nions were mixed on the idea that MNOs would then reinvest the re-
sulting revenues in areas lacking coverage, thereby shifting the burden
to other parties. The literature refers to this as the ‘transfer of risk’ to
others within a sharing agreement (Bing et al., 2005). These issues are
exacerbated in contexts where there are no institutional incentives. In
such cases, incumbent MNOs tend to be reluctant to share their net-
works with new entrants.
The degree of network coverage symmetry was another factor
mentioned by interviewees. Among the sampled countries, there exists
network asymmetry among MNOs due to markets being dominated by
one or two MNOs for several years before the governments allowed the
entry of additional operators. Interviewees revealed that the competi-
tive nature of MNOs is a barrier to increasing IS. This is underlined in
the following interview excerpt:
The answer [the lack of IS adoption] really depends on the market. In
some cases, MNOs may be reluctant to give up strategic tower positions
(e.g. on hills) or share access with competitors. (Interviewee 20)
Interviewee 4 stated that, in terms of network coverage, some MNOs
are ‘good’ on some markets and not so good in others. Typically, in the
markets where MNO networks are widespread, they hesitate to share
infrastructure to keep their market leader advantage but prefer sharing
Fig. 1. Data analysis mapping.
Fig. 2. Theoretical model for assessing IS practices.
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in markets where they have weak positions.
Our dataset coalesces around the view that competition further
complicates IS adoption, as MNOs believe that sharing would cause
them to lose their competitive (or first-mover) advantages and, by ex-
tension, their market share. This is because several MNOs in SSA
compete in terms of cost and network coverage rather than service and
technological innovation and, thus, sharing their infrastructure is per-
ceived as eroding their competitive advantages. This is further ex-
acerbated by the issue of on-and-off net tariffs – considering that MNOs
who rollout first often capture the market and maintain their market
share through on-net tariffs. On-net tariffs refer to MNOs offering low
tariffs to users within the same network and higher off-net tariffs to
users on rivals’ networks. In this scenario, apart from the unwillingness
of incumbents to share their networks, MNOs with low numbers of
subscribers may not benefit much from IS because of the high margins
between on-and-off net tariffs. This suggests that network externality
tends to favour the incumbents, while its negative impact on small
players may altogether lead to a lack of IS.
5.2. Technological factors
Our findings further illustrate that technology-related factors are
important antecedents of MNOs’ disposition to engage in IS. Network
and technology compatibility, complementarity, and interoperability
are important determinants of MNOs’ assessment of IS perceived ben-
efits. Accordingly, network compatibility has held back IS adoption.
The interviewees argued that, for smooth IS operation, the networks of
different MNOs need to be compatible to enable interoperability.
Interviewee 16 revealed that:
From the *** [an international lending organisation] side, what we
are trying to push is cross-sector infrastructure sharing in East Africa but
complexities in technology such as network compatibility are restricting
progress.
Interviewee 2 was particularly vocal on cross-sector IS, arguing that
since the most expensive part of infrastructure deployment are civil
works, namely the digging and paving of roads for laying cables, cross-
sector collaboration between sectors could help reduce costs. For ex-
ample, the ministry of works can collaborate with the ministry of tel-
ecommunication by inviting MNOs to lay their cables during road
construction. This will reduce infrastructure deployment costs for all
the parties involved and, since such activity may require permission
and/or rights of way, these could be negotiated and obtained jointly.
However, recounting the experience of Eastern African countries, in-
terviewee 16 stated that the implementation of cross-sector IS can be
problematic, owing to the complexity that arises from the lack of net-
work compatibility – as the networks of different MNOs are built-out
using equipment from different vendors such as Ericsson, Huawei, and
Nokia. While some equipment is standardised, others may be proprie-
tary technology unique to individual vendors/MNOs. This suggests that,
in the event of IS, the compatibility of networks may be difficult and, by
extension, so would their interoperability.
Concerns over intellectual property protection (IPP) is another issue
impacting MNOs’ disposition to coopete. Apart from standardised
technology, core networks contain proprietary technology may be pa-
tented and exclusive to a particular MNO (D'Este & Patel, 2007; Fatehi
& Choi, 2019). Respondents noted that the lack of trust among MNOs
due to weak institutions could exacerbate the fear of losing such patent
technology to rivals. SSA countries suffer from institutional voids (see
Table 2 for selected SSA rankings), which materialise in the form of
weak IPP laws and inefficient dispute resolution mechanisms, which
amplify MNOs’ concerns over IPP and knowledge sharing, which are
integral part of IS agreements.
Apart from the fear of losing proprietary technology, interviewees
argued that the concerns over QoS are another technological issue that
limits IS adoption in Africa. For example, Interviewee 1 stated that:
In Nigeria, the colocation of infrastructure is entrenched in the in-
dustry, and active infrastructure sharing is what is now being de-
veloped for the industry by the regulator. However, the operators
have mixed views about the introduction and acceptability of active
infrastructure sharing due to […] quality of service concerns.
Interviewee 1 further asserted that the threat of diminished QoS
owing to IS might undermine revenue. This is because coverage and
service reliability are among the critical factors that influence the
choice of mobile users. Interviewee 19 added that MNOs, particularly
incumbents, sometimes accuse other MNOs of disrupting the perfor-
mance of their networks due to increases in mobile users and traffic.
Our dataset suggests that an increase in the number of mobile users
without a corresponding increase in network capacity tends to reduce
QoS. As such, MNOs are reluctant to participate in IS to maintain their
QoS and customer experience. Regardless of IS, poor QoS is prevalent in
Africa (Onyeajuwa, 2017; TeleGeography, 2018).
5.3. Institutional environment
As highlighted in the previous sections, our dataset highlighted that
the weak institutional environments in the analysed countries exacer-
bate the issues related to market and technological factors. Our findings
further show that a country's institutional capacity – in terms of robust
legal and regulatory framework – and the capacity to enforce it, as well
as institutional incentives, can act as drivers or prohibitors of IS for
MNOs. This is reinforced by interviewee 11:
We have also tried to push this through regulatory infrastructure,
but the regulator is not very effective in helping to drive decisions
with the needed framework […].
IS arrangements involve several complex issues, which in the ab-
sence of a clear regulatory framework, can discourage MNOs from
collaborating. Interviewees highlighted that, whilst regulators are quick
to mandate IS, there is little to no provision within IS frameworks on
how to deal with, for example, cost issues. This has created frictions
among MNOs in countries such as Zimbabwe, where Econet has refused
to share its infrastructure until a ‘fair’ costing structure is put in place,
since Econet has invested more in deploying infrastructure over time
compared to its rivals (Mhlanga, 2017). Interviewee 5 further asserted
that, without a robust IS regulatory framework, it becomes difficult to
structure the rules of engagement to prevent infrastructure owners from
exploiting that ownership unfairly, engaging in collusive behaviour
with other large players, and using their market power to make excess
profits. The lack of a clear regulatory framework also has implications
for how MNOs address issues of infrastructure maintenance and up-
grade. Interviewee 5 commented that:
The second issue [with infrastructure sharing] is ensuring that net-
works are upgraded as required and I think that can be more difficult to
do if you have a single network. This makes it difficult to ascertain, for
example, who is to be responsible for network maintenance, when is the
right time to carry out an upgrade, who pays for it […], and how to
calculate what each MNO needs to contribute?
Since telecommunication networks are affected by obsolescence and
changes in technology, interviewees noted the need to make provisions
for periodic network maintenance and eventual upgrades. Zimbabwe is
one example where the incumbent, Econet, has resisted sharing its in-
frastructure with Telecel and NetOne on the grounds that all MNOs
have to equally contribute to network maintenance. Since this issue is
not currently covered within the IS framework, IS has become proble-
matic in Zimbabwe (Mhlanga, 2017).
A reason for this lack of a robust legal and regulatory framework is
the general lack of regulatory capacity. This capacity includes the level
of relevant skills and funds available to enable regulators to discharge
their duties. Interviewees argued that, although regulatory capacity is
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critical to the successful use of IS in advancing mobile coverage, reg-
ulatory bodies across Africa are generally faced with skill and funding
shortages. For example, interviewee 18 asserted that:
Then, you may also think of mandating it [infrastructure sharing] but
then you may need to force them, you need to monitor it, you need to
come up with a fair price etc., and all these further lead to complications
given the general lack of regulatory capacity in most countries.
There exists consensus among interviewees that, to create a robust
legal and regulatory framework, regulatory authorities need to be able
to rely on people that have the relevant skills and on funds to enforce
implementation, especially when considering the growing number of
countries, including Uganda and Zimbabwe, that are beginning to
mandate IS (Arakpogun et al., 2017). The lack of incentives from
governments to encourage MNOs towards IS was also highlighted by
the interviewees. Accordingly, regulators need to offer policies that
include better incentives to those who can deploy, for example, more
towers. For example,
Deployment of infrastructure together is actually a great idea. The pro-
blem for the government is to make it happen. The basic task for the
government, in this case, is to provide incentives for operators to colla-
borate; where this is lacking, infrastructure sharing becomes problematic.
(Interviewee 2)
Trust is a critical success factor for the multilateral cooperation on
infrastructure (Warsen et al., 2018). However, interviewees revealed
that the lack of trust among competing MNOs undermines the quality of
services. Moreover, there appear to be trust-related issues between
MNOs and policymakers due to concerns that the regulatory and legal
framework needed for an effective IS implementation in Africa may be
lacking. This is evident from the following responses:
But we know that [infrastructure sharing] works in certain type of
countries, but do we know if it works in an African country? The reg-
ulators and the operators recommend it […] but if you want to share
things, then it needs some level of trust. Do I trust the operator? Do I trust
the regulator to oversee it? […] So, you have the legal regime in most
countries to enforce a sharing agreement? Or do the operators trust each
other enough to avoid going to court? [...] So when you say let's share
things, we can potentially run into quite serious problems. (Interviewee
6).
Think about the pros and cons of getting married! And then translate that
into sharing a bed with someone you don't love (trust). (Interviewee 3)
Interviewee 19 further corroborated this by recounting a recent
experience from Liberia, where the three major MNOs attempted sev-
eral times to engage in IS for a few months before the arrangements fell
apart due to the lack of trust among operators. It is good practice for the
IS regulatory and legal framework to include some level of regulatory
governance, which translates into enforcing guidelines for smooth im-
plementation and a speedy dispute settlement mechanism (Mkhomazi &
Iyamu, 2011). Our dataset revealed that, in countries where effective
governance mechanisms are lacking, trust is eroded, and it becomes
difficult for MNOs to support or take up IS. Overall, the interviewees
suggested that a lack of trust limits cooperation and the adoption of IS
among MNOs.
5.4. MNOs coopetitive orientation
Industry/market characteristics, technological factors, and the in-
stitutional environment shape firms’ coopetitive orientation. The ex-
ternal environment affects MNO managers’ assessment of the perceived
benefits of IS. This also shapes their mental models that determine the
way they perceive competitive environments. Some possess a coopeti-
tive mindset, being ‘people who have the cognitive frames and cogni-
tive processes to understand and handle the paradox’ of cooperating
and competing simultaneously (Gnyawali et al., 2016, p. 13), while
others possess a competitive mindset which emphasises maximising
firm benefits without collective action. A key attribute that enables the
successful adoption of technology is the support of top-level manage-
ment through a firm's business strategy (Angeles, 2013; Awa et al.,
2016).
Our analysis further emphasises the importance of MNOs to develop
a coopetitive orientation as to scale up IS in Africa. MNOs’ coopetitive
orientation is the extent to which they are behaviourally disposed to
cooperate with their competitors. This orientation materialises in a
firm's dominant logic, being reflected in its routinised ways of doing
things and embedded in its organisational strategies and processes. If
they have a coopetitive orientation, MNOs view IS as part of their
business models and look for ways to mitigate existing and potential
challenges. Conversely, if MNOs do not see IS as part of their business
strategy, its adoption becomes a problem from the outset, such as in the
case of South Africa, where MNOs such as MTN have been criticised for
not implementing IS despite the directives of the Electronic
Communications Act (van de Groenendaal, 2018). This helps explain
why the independent ownership of the 30,000+ towers in South Africa
is below 10%, despite being one of the leading mobile markets in
Africa. Interviewee 11 affirmed that:
We have very strong views in order to provide proper broadband,
especially like LTE, that the only model to go is to build a shared
broadband network in which we all become wholesalers (tenants).
Another MNO that has embraced IS as a business strategy is Bharti
Airtel of India, with a mobile footprint across 14 African countries
(Arakpogun et al., 2017), as confirmed by Interviewee 4:
I think, as operators we have increased our level of engagement
because we feel that we would provide more value to the sector by
looking at efficiency and one of the ways of doing it is by sharing
infrastructure. This is […] something that we align with.
To reduce duplication and operation costs, Airtel made a top man-
agement decision to outsource their passive infrastructure to a depen-
dent firm – Indus Towers – via JV ownership with rivals such as
Vodafone (Palepu & Bijlani, 2012). These answers also highlight the
need for MNOs to shift from a competition-based dominant logic to a
coopetitive one to be able to embrace IS. Since IS is rooted in the
business and operation strategy of Airtel, Airtel has offloaded 10,000+
towers, becoming the leading adopters of PIS in Africa
(TowerXchange, 2016). As MNOs start to engage in IS, the related
learning process shapes their perceptions of how to work coopetitively.
Increasing the IS level in turn changes the market characteristics and
the level of trust among collaborating MNOs starts to increase. However
as previously highlighted, for trust to emerge among MNOs, there is a
need for an efficient regulatory environment.
5.5. Mandating versus non-mandating IS
Our findings point out that, for IS to be successful, governments
need to create an enabling environment that encourages MNOs to
participate in this process (Garcia & Kelly, 2016). Interviewees argued
that the emerging trend of mandating IS in African countries can dis-
courage MNOs to cooperate with the regulators and participate in IS.
Interviewee 14 illustrated this thought as:
The government of Uganda has an agreement with Korea Telecom to
build one of these networks […] but if this network is built but none
of the existing Ugandan operators want to use it, then it's a disaster.
So, for sharing to work, the government needs to find a way to do it
in a cooperative way with the industry. I don't think you can force
operators or should force operators to share where they don't want
to.
Evidence of the difficulty of mandating IS can be observed in South
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Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Consequently, following
criticism, South Africa recently withdrew its proposed Electronic
Communication Amendment Bill, which, among other things, man-
dated MNOs to provide wholesale access to infrastructure on an open-
access basis. In acknowledging this problem, Interviewee 9 suggested
that it would be initially preferable to encourage MNOs to discuss IS
amongst themselves, while also defining the general framework and
maximum lead times for the realisation of the relevant practical mod-
alities. Failing this, the regulator can then intervene to establish the
rules applicable to all MNOs for IS implementation. Moreover, other
interviewees argued that, if regulators want to mandate IS, they need
the capacity to monitor and enforce it, which has proven to be lacking.
The comments of the interviewees validated the suggestion that,
instead of mandating IS, policymakers should create favourable con-
ditions and incentives to encourage MNOs to embrace IS (Malungu &
Moturi, 2015; Schorr, 2008). The implementation of IS has been suc-
cessful in India, relative to African countries, due to a strategy of in-
centives to encourage IS in a manner that does not undermine com-
petition (Cohen & Southwood, 2008). For example, MNOs that
participate in PIS benefit from the financial subventions for rural lo-
cations; earnings from IS could be subject to tax exemptions, the terms
of IS are based on commercial agreements between MNOs; licence
conditions have been amended to allow for AIS albeit restricted to
antennas, feeder cables, radio access network, and transmission sys-
tems; and MNOs can explore alternative sources of energy to tackle the
lack of electricity (TRAI, 2007). ITU News Magazine (2017) concludes
that, although many factors contributed to the growth of mobile tele-
communications in India, PIS played an important part. Table 2 pro-
vides a summary of our findings and highlights the main similarities
and differences across the sampled cases in relation to their stance on IS
mandates.
6. Discussion and conclusions
Theory strongly suggests the practice of rival firms pooling re-
sources together to cooperate in one domain, while competing in other
functional areas. However, the empirical literature on the drivers and
barriers of coopetition is limited and shows mixed results. Moreover,
this research stream has neglected the role of institutions in fostering
coopetition (Dorn et al., 2016; Lascaux, 2020). Using a sample of MNOs
across seven SSA countries and based on the coopetition-based view
(Amankwah-Amoah, 2020), we found evidence of the limited coopeti-
tion among MNOs. The limited uptake of the important coopetition
practice of IS is caused by a number of factors. Our study reveals that
the institutional environment, market/industry structures, and tech-
nological factors impact MNOs’ orientation towards cooperative stra-
tegies. We also found that institutional factors shape the impact of the
industry structure and technological factors on firms’ propensity to
engage in coopetitive strategies. Regulators and institutional environ-
ment characteristics play important roles in incentivising or disin-
centivising firms to cooperate, even if the market conditions are not
necessarily conducive for cooperative behaviours. Regulators in the
telecommunications sector can, through their interventions, correct
market failures or create additional ones.
Together, the institutional, market, and technological factors shape
MNOs’ cooperative orientation (Bouncken & Fredrich, 2016). Ad-
ditionally, the managers of such MNOs can perceive the benefits of
coopetitive strategies and trust their partners and the regulators. There
is evidence that MNOs’ cooperative orientation determines their parti-
cipation in IS and their level of engagement in active versus passive
sharing. Finally, the level of IS practices in certain contexts influences
the industry, market structure, and technological factors. In contexts
with low-level IS, inadequate regulatory interventions mean that the
existing market conditions are reproduced, leading to further compe-
titive behaviours from MNOs. Whereas in for high-level IS, MNOs tend
to engage in further coopetitive strategies through strategic learning, as
well as cooperate to resolve technological incompatibilities and engage
in standards settings.
Similar to the coopetition literature, we find coopetition is likely to
occur under specific market and industry conditions (Dorn et al., 2016;
Dowling et al., 1996; Dagnino & Padula, 2007). We find that demand,
market size, and the saturation level impact MNOs propensity to engage
in IS. In several SSA countries, the rural areas with low-income levels
and low population density are not economically attractive for MNOs
due to their high sunk costs even when jointly deploying networks. The
incumbents who might already have created networks in such areas can
be reluctant to share their networks with new entrants. Furthermore,
the mobile technology level is still lagging in several SSA countries,
with some areas still operating on 2G networks. In these markets, MNOs
compete based on network coverage rather than service differentiation
or introducing new technological innovations. As such, incumbents are
reluctant to engage in IS, as this would erode the competitive advantage
on which they depend.
Finally, in SSA countries, the industry has likely been dominated by
one or two MNOs for a number of years before the entry of additional
MNOs. This has led to asymmetric networks, whereby the incumbents
have wider and greater network capacities. The incumbents thus tend
to prefer avoiding IS to preserve their competitive advantage. These
issues are exacerbated in countries with weak institutional environ-
ments that lack the institutional capacity to provide a clear regulatory
framework for defining and managing IS. Moreover, the lack of in-
stitutional incentives, in the form of efficient universal service funds or
tax incentives to encourage the sharing or joint deployment of networks
among MNOs, lead MNOs to adopt a competitive rather than a co-
operative orientation.
Our findings also show the importance of technological factors in
influencing MNOs coopetitive orientation. The coopetition literature
points to the importance of technological complementarity and re-
source endowment similarity for inducing coopetition between com-
petitors (Dorn et al., 2016; Gnyawali & Park, 2009). Firms might col-
laborate in the context of R&D to acquire knowledge that is otherwise
inaccessible. In the context of IS, this translates to network coverage
and locations, which might motivate MNOs to engage in IS if their
network coverage is complementary. However, the compatibility of the
technologies used by MNOs to enable IS is equally important. Differ-
ences in capabilities can also be a barrier to IS, as some MNOs express
concerns about QoS issues due to IS on networks with limited capacity.
Finally, concerns on information and knowledge sharing and IPP also
inhibit MNOs from IS. This is particularly prominent in the absence of a
robust and transparent regulatory framework that clearly defines IS.
The lack of institutional capacity results in limited trust among MNOs,
leading to a reduction in the perceived benefits of IS and the adoption
of a more competitive orientation. Strong institutional environments
are thus vital for facilitating MNOs’ engagement in IS through effective
regulatory interventions.
Our findings further suggest induced and mandated coopetition
practices among the sample MNOs. However, in the telecommunica-
tions industry, the distinction between forced (mandated) and induced
(non-mandated) IS is too simplistic and its impact contingent on several
factors. There are variations among countries regarding the way IS is
mandated. This includes strict rules in requiring IS, approaches re-
quiring PIS, and approaches which encourage but does not mandate it.
Where IS was mandated, the incumbent MNOs engaged in passive
collaboration (Czakon & Rogalski, 2014), which entails following the
minimum legal requirements. This practice has led some MNOs to be
reluctant to invest in new networks or engage in network upgrades and
technology development due to the lack of a clear regulatory frame-
work and institutional incentives. However, in contexts where a ‘softer’
approach was adopted or where IS was not mandated at all, IS sharing
practices emerged over time with encouragement from regulators.
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6.1. Theoretical contributions
Overall, our study contributes to the coopetition and IS sharing
literature by pointing out and specifying how the institutional en-
vironment can induce or hinder coopetitive behaviours among firms.
Although the impact of external institutions on coopetitive behaviours
is well recognised, our understanding of institutional influence is not
sufficiently developed (Dorn et al., 2016). Our study adds to this body
of knowledge by highlighting the essential role of strong and efficient
institutions in scaling up IS among MNOs. Moreover, it underscores that
mandated and non-mandated regulatory environments trigger different
cooperative or competitive logics among managers and firms.
Additionally, the significant role of trust in developing coopetitive
behaviours and fostering coopetitive practices has been highlighted,
thus enriching the coopetitive perspective scholarship and enhancing
our understanding of the phenomenon. However, our context is im-
portant in further enriching our understanding of coopetition dynamics
(Bengston & Raza-Ullah, 2016; Dorn et al., 2016). The tele-
communications industry as a highly regulated and high-tech industry
is important in determining the different dynamics of coopetition across
industries. Finally, the research focus on SSA countries, given their
unique characteristics, has enhanced our understanding of coopetition
dynamics.
Our paper further draws attention to the socio-environmental ben-
efits of coopetition (Blanco et al., 2009; De Marchi, 2012). The litera-
ture on coopetition has mostly focused on situations where firms en-
gage in coopetition to derive private benefits (Volschenk et al., 2016).
However, as Volschenk et al. (2016) argue, coopetitive relationships
can have societal and environmental benefits beyond individual firms’
benefits, which accrue to a wider set of stakeholders. Our paper draws
attention to the context of IS between MNOs, which in addition to re-
ducing MNOs costs, also has important environmental implications and
the potential to expand telecommunication and mobile network ser-
vices to underserved areas.
6.2. Policy recommendations and contribution to practice
There are number policy implications stemming from our findings.
First, to mitigate the lack of trust, policymakers could facilitate an
environment where MNOs are obliged to each other by creating a JV
model of IS as open access that is managed by the government. This
would mean rival firms all have a stake in the successful outcome of IS
and could be even managed by the private sector, which is better skilled
and equipped to execute IS, and regulated by policymakers to prevent
rent-seeking MNOs from exploiting the situation. Second, to address the
issue of risk-shifting, where some MNOs are accused of not re-investing
the cost-savings from IS in areas lacking coverage, policymakers could
ensure public disclosure, so that stakeholders such as the civil society
could use the information to demand accountability from the various
parties involved. Third, to address the concern that IS on its own cannot
provide a mechanism to change the prevailing circumstances in non-
commercially viable areas, the case for a natural monopoly was made.
Interviewees argued that, for a country with geographical challenges
such as large distances and isolated areas, limited competition that
guarantees increasing returns to scale may be a better choice.
Isolated areas could be allocated among MNOs, which could then be
issued a ‘non-competing licence’ to be the sole providers of their al-
lotted locations. This would enable MNOs to serve isolated areas
without competition. Additionally, policymakers should consider
mandating the elimination of mobile termination rates (MTR) between
MNOs for serving isolated areas, so that all players can connect custo-
mers across such areas to the national network. Mandating MTR for
isolated areas would allow the various MNOs national roaming and
connectivity with rival networks in areas they lack footprint and vice
versa. This would not only contribute to addressing affordability, but
also encourage wider IS participation. This approach would also
prevent incumbents from charging high off-net tariffs that could hinder
the expansion and operation of small players and limit them from
benefiting from network externality.
6.3. Limitations and scope for future research
Although this study has yielded insightful outcomes and enriched
the coopetition literature, it is not without limitations. Despite the
several attempts of contacting more participants to balance the spread
of stakeholder groups, our efforts have only limited success. This is
particularly notable among regulators; whose websites were either not
accessible and/or contacts were difficult to make. Most regulators
whose contact details were available were not willing to participate; it
also took over 6 months to conclude the interview process with the
consenting regulators compared to the 1 month for multinational MNOs
and UAS consultants. Furthermore, while this research was conducted
from the supply-side perspective of improving physical infrastructure,
the digital divide in Africa can also be explained from a demand-side
standpoint, which is not covered in this paper. Therefore, future re-
search could investigate IS from a demand-side perspective to uncover
how barriers such as affordability, digital awareness and literacy, lack
of local content, and digital gender divide could limit IS adoption.
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